منابع مشابه
Dynamic moral hazard without commitment
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Ce document est publié dans l'intention de rendre accessibles les résultats préliminaires de la recherche effectuée au CIRANO, afin de susciter des échanges et des suggestions. Les idées et les opinions émises sont sous l'unique responsabilité des auteurs, et ne représentent pas nécessairement les positions du CIRANO ou de ses partenaires. This paper presents preliminary research carried out at...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-015-0494-6