Dynamic Regulation of Public Good Quality
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Public good games on dynamic networks
Axelrod (The evolution of cooperation, 1984) and others explain how cooperation can emerge in repeated 2-person prisoner’s dilemmas. But in public good games with anonymous contributions, we expect a breakdown of cooperation because direct reciprocity fails. However, if agents are situated in a social network determining which agents interact, and if they can influence the network, then coopera...
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15 صفحه اولSort out Your Neighbourhood: Public Good Games on Dynamic Networks
Axelrod (1984) and others explain how cooperation can emerge in repeated 2-person prisoner's dilemmas. But in public good games with anonymous contributions, we expect a breakdown of cooperation because direct reciprocity fails. However, if agents are situated in a social network determining which agents interact, and if they can in uence the network, then cooperation can be a viable strategy. ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.892586