Dynamic supply chain coordination games with repeated bargaining

Dynamic supply chain coordination games with repeated bargaining

Coordination in a supply chains may require investment in relationship-specific assets (RSA) including information systems and human resources from all or a subset of the partners. These investments are typically partially non-verifiable, possibly based on internal resources or opportunity costs. A supplier offers a single-price single-period contract to a downstream manufacturer who accepts or...

Bargaining and Repeated Games

Dynamic Bargaining in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Demand Information

We analyze a dynamic bargaining game between a seller and a buyer, who negotiate over quantity and payment to trade for a product. Both firms are impatient, and they alternate in making a contract offer until an agreement is reached. The buyer is privately informed about his type, which can be either high or low, with respect to the property of the uncertain demand he faces. The demand distribu...

Bargaining power in repeated games

In this paper, we propose a refinement of the subgame perfect equilibrium concept for infinitely repeated games, selection-consistent perfect equilibrium. This concept reflects the idea that players may not expect future bargaining power to be correlated with bygone actions. The equilibrium payoff set is generated by equilibria with a simple recursive structure. When discounting tends to zero, ...

Dual-Channel Supply Chain Coordination Strategy with Dynamic Cooperative Advertising

With the rapid development of electronic commerce, many manufacturers choose to establish dualchannel supply chains. To promote sales, the manufacturer in a dual-channel supply chain usually invests in national advertising and provides support to the retailer who promotes the goodwill through local advertisement. In our research, we use a Stackelberg differential game theoretic model to show th...