Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Strategic information transmission networks
We study a model of multi-player communication. Privately informed decision makers have different preferences about the actions they take, and communicate to influence each others’ actions in their favor. We prove that the equilibrium capability of any player to send a truthful message to a set of players depends not only on the preference composition of those players, but also on the number of...
متن کاملStrategic Information Transmission in Networks
This paper introduces a tractable model to study cheap talk in networks. Although the analysis is apparently very intricate, we provide sharp equilibrium and welfare characterizations, that we then use to address a number of theoretical economic questions. First, we advance the study of homophily, by finding that truthful communication across communities decreases as populations become larger. ...
متن کاملDynamic strategic information transmission
This paper studies strategic information transmission in a dynamic environment, where a privately informed expert and a decision maker interact for a nite number of periods. Our theoretical results argue that the dynamic cheap talk games are fundamentally di¤erent from static ones. First, information can be fully revealed. Second, there exist non monotonic equilibria. Third, there is no genera...
متن کاملCommunication Information Dynamics in (Endogenous) Social Networks
We develop a model of information exchange through communication and investigate its implications for information aggregation in large societies. An underlying state (of the world) determines which action has higher payoff. Agents decide which agents to form a communication link with incurring the associated cost and receive a private signal correlated with the underlying state. They then excha...
متن کاملNon-Fully Strategic Information Transmission
Building on Crawford and Sobels (1982) general communication model, this paper introduces the possibility that players are non-strategic. The sender may be honest and have a preference for speaking truthfully. The receiver may be naive and erroneously believe that the sender is truthful. In contrast to the predictions of the fully-strategic model, we show that there is an equilibrium where com...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics
سال: 2019
ISSN: 1933-6837
DOI: 10.3982/te3056