Econometric Analysis of Games with Multiple Equilibria
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Annual Review of Economics
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1941-1383,1941-1391
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-economics-081612-185944