Efficiency and behavioral considerations in labor negotiations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Efficiency and Behavioral Considerations in Labor Negotiations
Experimental literature has shown that social preferences influence how individuals bargain and make sharing decisions. It usually considers situations in which individuals negotiate on a single issue. This paper explores a different environment and reports on an experiment based on a non-cooperative game in which the choice of the bargaining agenda is endogenous. We fnd that firms reveal a str...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Psychology
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0167-4870
DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2010.04.003