Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Efficiency levels in sequential auctions with dynamic arrivals
In an environment with dynamic arrivals of players who wish to purchase only one of multiple identical objects for which they have a private value, we analyze a sequential auction mechanism with an activity rule. If the players play undominated strategies then we are able to bound the efficiency loss compared to an optimal mechanism that maximizes the total welfare. We have no assumptions on th...
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Sequential auctions can be used to provide solutions to the multi-robot task-allocation problem. In this paper we extend previous work on sequential auctions and propose an algorithm that clusters and auctions uninitiated task clusters repeatedly upon the completion of individual tasks. We demonstrate empirically that our algorithm results in lower overall team costs than other sequential aucti...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-013-0405-7