Efficiency of Classical and Quantum Games Equilibria
نویسندگان
چکیده
Nash equilibria and correlated of classical quantum games are investigated in the context their Pareto efficiency. The examples prisoner’s dilemma, battle sexes game chicken studied. Correlated usually improve but require a trusted correlation device susceptible to manipulation. extension these Eisert–Wilkens–Lewenstein formalism Frąckiewicz–Pykacz parameterization is analyzed. It shown that mixed Pauli strategies closer optimal results than counter-parts. relationship also
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Entropy
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['1099-4300']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/e23050506