Efficiency of Lowest-Unmatched Price Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Efficiency of Lowest-Unmatched Price Auctions
In Lowest-Unmatched Price Auctions (LUPA) all participants pay a bidding fee and the lowest bid placed by only one participant wins. Many LUPAs do not specify what happens with the item on offer if there is no unmatched bid. The item may remain with the auctioneer which may appear unfair given that the auctioneer collects the bidding fees. We show that in a symmetric Nash equilibrium of a LUPA ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2016.02.012