Efficient and Robust Equilibrium Strategies of Utilities in Day-Ahead Market With Load Uncertainty

We consider the scenario where $N$ utilities strategically bid for electricity in day-ahead market and balance mismatch between committed supply actual demand real-time market, with uncertainty local renewable generation consideration. model interactions among as a noncooperative game, which each utility aims atminimizing its per-unit cost. investigate utilities’ optimal bidding strategies show that all according to (net load) prediction is unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium two salient properties. First, it incurs no loss of efficiency; hence, competition does not increase social Second, robust (0, notation="LaTeX">$N-1$ ) fault immune. That is, behaviors irrational only help reduce other rational costs. The expected supply–demand minimized simultaneously, improves planning supply-and-demand matching efficiency chain. prove results hold under settings correlated errors general class spot pricing models, capture relationship price, clearing market-level mismatch. Simulations based on real-world traces corroborate our theoretical findings. Our article adds new insights mechanism design. In particular, we derive set fairly sufficient conditions operator design schemes so admit desired equilibrium.