Efficient Auditing and Enforcement in Dynamic Contracts
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Efficient Auditing and Enforcement in Dynamic Contracts ( Job Market Paper ) ∗
Private information and limited enforcement are two frictions that impede the provision of first best insurance against income risk. To mitigate these frictions, societies make costly investments into technologies such as auditing and enforcement systems. The implicit assumption throughout most of the literature is that either or both of these technologies is either costless or infinitely costl...
متن کاملFinancial Contracts and Enforcement
(a) (Limited) Commitment and renegotiation (b) Payments and enforcement are chosen optimally as part of a PBNE (c) Information revelation (d) Stochastic versus deterministic contracts (debt is optimal when commitment is limited) 3. Enforcement and firm finance: Krasa, Sharma and Villamil [7] (a) The model (b) The effect of c on firm finance (c) The effect of η on firm finance
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This paper studies the link between enforcement in financial contracts and output volatility. In particular we study how cycles and importantly recessions can be amplified in economies with weak contract enforcement. The idea of the paper is that firms in economies with enforcement problems will not be able to have the optimal scale of production because investors cannot enforce the collection ...
متن کاملDiscretionary Enforcement of Electronic Contracts
As in traditional commerce, parties to a contract in ebusiness environments are expected to operate in good faith and comply with mutually agreed terms of contract. It may be the case however that deviation from the agreed contract obligations occur either intentionally or due to force majeure. In this paper we argue that there is value in providing various levels of automated support to deal w...
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This paper studies the relation between firm size, leverage, exit and growth in an environment of incomplete markets and lack of enforcement. In the data large firms have lower growth and exit rates yet higher leverage. The idea of the paper is that high productivity firms will be larger and have a greater degree of enforcement because their outside option relative to the value of their product...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1928037