Efficient Dynamic Auctions

Efficient Dynamic Auctions

We consider the truthful implementation of the socially efficient allocation in a dynamic private value environment in which agents receive private information over time. We show that a suitable generalization of the Vickrey-ClarkGroves mechanism, based on the marginal contribution of each agent, leads to truth-telling in every period. A leading example of a dynamic allocation model is the sequ...

Efficient Auctions

We exhibit an efficient auction (an auction that maximizes surplus conditional on all available information). For private values, the Vickrey auction (for one good) or its Groves-Clarke extension (for multiple goods) is efficient. We show that the Vickrey and Groves-Clarke auctions can be generalized to attain efficiency when there are common values, if each buyer’s information can be represent...

Dynamic Auctions

Many important economic problems have been studied with the tools of auction theory and mechanism design more generally. Much of the literature, however, studies a static, one-time decision. In many problems of interest, more than a single decision needs to be made; rather, a sequence of decisions needs to be made. These decisions often depend crucially on the dynamic aspects of the environment...

Summary of : " Efficient Auctions

Efficient Iterative Combinatorial Auctions

This survey considers the following setting. A seller wants to sell a set of indivisible goods. A set of buyers are interested in buying the goods. Buyers have private values for bundles of goods they are interested in buying. The seller’s objective is to allocate the goods to the buyers efficiently (maximizing the total utility of buyers). Since the values of buyers are private information, th...