Efficient implementation with interdependent valuations and maxmin agents
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Implementation with Interdependent Valuations
It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement e¢ cient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agents type a¤ects other agentsutilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to truthfully reveal his type when faced with CGV payments. We show that when agents are informationally sma...
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There is a large literature aimed at characterizing the social choice functions that can be implemented in Bayes Nash equilibria. This literature typically takes agentsinformation as exogenously given and xed throughout the analysis. While for some problems this may be appropriate, the assumption is problematic for others. A typical analysis, relying on the revelation principle, maximizes som...
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I show that a unique equilibrium exists in an asymmetric two-player all-pay auction with a discrete signal structure, correlated signals, and interdependent valuations. The proof is constructive, and the construction can be implemented as a computer program and be used to derive comparative statics. I also characterize the set of equilibria when a reserve price is introduced. ∗Department of Eco...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.007