Efficient solutions for bargaining problems with claims
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Efficient solutions to bargaining problems with uncertain disagreement points
We consider a cooperative model of bargaining where the location of the disagreement point may be uncertain. Based on the maximin criterion, we formulate an ex ante efficiency condition and characterize the class of bargaining solutions satisfying this axiom. These solutions are generalizations of the monotone path solutions. Adding individual rationality yields a subclass of these solutions. B...
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By refering to the Bargaining Problem the economic literature means a situation in which a group of individuals seek to reach an agreement on a partition of a pie. Following Nash (1950) the two players bargaining problem is described using only two components (S, d) when d is a point in the plane which can be interpreted as the outcome when no agreement is reached and S is a compact convex subs...
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Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a correspondence between classical bargaining solutions and usual claims rules. In particular, we show that...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Social Sciences
سال: 1995
ISSN: 0165-4896
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4896(94)00775-4