Efficient Sorting in a Dynamic Adverse-Selection Model
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Efficient Sorting in a Dynamic Adverse-Selection Model
We discuss a class of markets for durable goods where efficiency (or approximate efficiency) is obtained despite the presence of information asymmetries. In the model, the number of times a good has changed hands (the vintage of the good) is an accurate signal of its quality, each consumer self-selects into obtaining the vintage that the social planner would have assigned to her, and consumers’...
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We study the possibility of achieving efficiency in a dynamic adverse selection market for durable goods. The idea is to use the number of times a car has been traded (“vintage”) as a signal of its quality. Higher-valuation consumers experiment with younger vintages. We first exhibit an impossibility result: no choice of (re)sale prices can induce consumers to follow this experimentation policy...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Economic Studies
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0034-6527,1467-937X
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937x.2005.00340.x