Efficient strategy-proof allocation functions in linear production economies
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods
Following the seminal work of Hurwicz (1972), the manipulability and efficiency of allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies have been studied intensively. Zhou (1991) established that any Pareto-efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanism is dictatorial in exchange economies with two agents having classical (i.e., continuous, strictly monotonic, and strictly convex) preferences. T...
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1 1 The authors thank the Indian Statistical Institute at New Delhi and the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration of the University of Maastricht for their hospitality. Thanks are also due to Lars Ehlers, Ton Storcken, and the anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. Public good economies where agents are endowed with strictly convex continuous single-peaked preferences on a conve...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 1999
ISSN: 0938-2259,1432-0479
DOI: 10.1007/s001990050341