Egalitarianism in Nontransferable Utility Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Balanced Nontransferable Utility Games in Graph Structure
By a game in coalitional structure or shortly coalitional game we mean the standard cooperative non-transferable utility game described by a nonempty set of payo®s for each coalition of players. It is well-known that balancedness is a su±cient condition for the nonemptiness of the core of such a cooperative non-transferable utility game. But any information on the internal organization of the c...
متن کاملAn Axiomatization of the Prekernel of Nontransferable Utility Games*
We characterize the prekernel of NTU games by means of consistency, converse consistency, and five axioms of the Nash type on bilateral problems. The intersection of the prekernel and the core is also characterized with the same axioms over the class of games where the core is nonempty.
متن کاملAn Anytime Algorithm for Finding the ?-Core in Nontransferable Utility Coalitional Games
We provide the first anytime algorithm for finding the -core in a nontransferable utility coalitional game. For a given set of possible joint actions, our algorithm calculates , the maximum utility any agent could gain by deviating from this set of actions. If is too high, our algorithm searches for a subset of the joint actions which leads to a smaller . Simulations show our algorithm is more ...
متن کاملEgalitarianism in convex fuzzy games
In this paper the egalitarian solution for convex cooperative fuzzy games is introduced. The classical Dutta-Ray algorithm for finding the constrained egalitarian solution for convex crisp games is adjusted to provide the egalitarian solution of a convex fuzzy game. This adjusted algorithm is also a finite algorithm, because the convexity of a fuzzy game implies in each step the existence ∗This...
متن کاملWeighted constrained egalitarianism in TU-games
The constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) for TUgames is extended to asymmetric cases, using the notion of weight systems as in Kalai and Samet (1987,1988). This weighted constrained egalitarian solution is based on the weighted Lorenz-criterion as an inequality measure. It is shown that in general there is at most one such weighted egalitarian solution for TU-games. Existenc...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2958780