Electoral Competition through Issue Selection

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Electoral Competition through Issue Selection

Politics must tackle multiple issues at once. In a first-best world, political competition constrains parties to prioritize issues according to the voters’ true concerns. In the real world, the opposite also happens: parties manipulate voter priorities by emphasizing issues selectively during the political campaign. This phenomenon, known as priming, should allow parties to pay less attention t...

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: American Journal of Political Science

سال: 2014

ISSN: 0092-5853

DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12120