Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attack on AES using Low-end Equipment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
AES side channel attack protection using random isomorphisms
General method of side-channel attacks protection, based on random cipher isomorphisms is presented. Isomorphic ciphers produce common outputs for common inputs. Cipher isomor-phisms can be changed independently on transmitting and receiving sides. Two methods of RIJNDAEL protection are considered. The first one is based on random commutative isomor-phisms of underlying structure. The set of fi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ECTI Transactions on Computer and Information Technology (ECTI-CIT)
سال: 2020
ISSN: 2286-9131,2286-9131
DOI: 10.37936/ecti-cit.2020142.239925