منابع مشابه
Eliciting information from a committee
The paper addresses the mechanism design problem of eliciting truthful information from a committee of informed experts who collude in their information disclosure strategies. It is shown that under fairly general conditions full information disclosure is possible if and only if the induced outcome is Pareto undominated for the committee members.
متن کاملEliciting Private Information from Selfish Agents Eliciting Private Information from Selfish Agents Abstract Eliciting Private Information from Selfish Agents
Eliciting Private Information from Selfish Agents
متن کاملEliciting Information from a Large Population
An uninformed welfare maximizing decision maker communicates with a random sample of agents from a large population who have heterogeneous preferences. Every agents preference is private information to himself. The population distribution of preferences is unknown and messages from the sampled agents are cheap talk. This paper o¤ers a tractable model of communication where the decision maker e...
متن کاملEliciting Private Information from Selfish Agents
Eliciting Private Information from Selfish Agents
متن کاملA Prescriptive Approach to Eliciting Decision Information
The importance of making good decisions is well-known in the business world and the perception of decision making as rational choice is the most common view. The amount of information involved in many decision making situations has increased dramatically in recent years and support of some kind is often needed. Consequently, fields like Business Intelligence (BI) and Decision Support Systems (D...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.04.008