Eliciting Multiple Prior Beliefs

نویسندگان

چکیده

Despite the increasing importance of multiple priors in various domains economics and significant theoretical advances concerning them, choice-based incentive-compatible multiple-prior elicitation largely remains an open problem. This paper develops a solution, comprising preference-based identification subject’s probability interval for event, two procedures eliciting it. The method does not rely on specific assumptions about subjects’ ambiguity attitudes or probabilistic sophistication. To demonstrate its feasibility, we implement it incentivized experiments to elicit equivalent cumulative distribution functions over continuous-valued sources uncertainty. We find predominance non-degenerate intervals among subjects all explored sources, with being wider less familiar sources. Finally, use our undertake first mixture coefficient Hurwicz α-maxmin EU model that fully controls beliefs.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Social Science Research Network

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['1556-5068']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3859711