Emotional Affectivity and the Question of Appraisal, Viewed in the Light of a Phenomenological Account of Pre-Reflective Affective Consciousness

The paper considers the problem of various different forms pre‑cognitive affective appraisal and their role in process gaining self-knowledge. According to phenomenological approach, if we are understand our inner states (our emotional experiences), these cannot be extracted from context within which they arise. Emotions not only refer subject, but also outer world a form response. Brentano, Husserl Scheler claimed that emotions directed towards values. It is this essential feature experience I would like turn. shall therefore re-examine Sartre’s views concerning affectivity (i.e. capacity reveal evaluatively significant qualities one’s environment), as well dual-aspect theory (reflective non-reflective) consciousness. main argument plausible account may provided on basis pre-reflective consciousness its relation reflexivity. will focus three claims about (affective) first these, large part cognition prelinguistic (pre-reflective) nature; argue evaluative content emotion conceptually determined, take non-conceptual (as appraisal). second claim refers notion affect, ought distinguished (unintentional) bodily sensations. third conceives between reflective (propositional attitudes) normative (rather than causal). aim demonstrate view must appeal aspect