Employee Representation and Financial Leverage
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Trade Liberalization and Financial Leverage
This paper argues that trade liberalization has a potentially significant impact on financial leverage. We compare the predictions of the trade-off model of capital structure with the pecking order model. In the first case, we suggest that trade liberalization affects the trade-off between the tax advantages of debt and expected bankruptcy costs. This implies that a reduction in domestic tariff...
متن کاملWindow Dressing of Financial Leverage
We investigate bank holding companies’ window dressing of quarter-end financial leverage through short-term borrowings, and the stock market reaction around the public release of information that can be used to infer such window dressing. We find evidence of downward window dressing of repo and federal funds liabilities that appear material for a large fraction of the sample, particularly among...
متن کاملThe Mediation Effect of Financial Leverage on the Relationship between Ownership Concentration and Financial Corporate Performance
The purpose of this paper is examining the impact of financial leverage as a mediation variable on the relationship between ownership concentration and financial corporate performance. To test the hypotheses, multiple regression analysis is used. The statistical population of this research is all listed companies in Tehran Stock Exchange. However, data were available only for 60 companies durin...
متن کاملBank Size, Leverage, and Financial Downturns
I construct a macroeconomic model with a financial sector in which the severity of financial downturns depends on size differences in the banking sector and average bank leverage. In my model, a more concentrated banking sector deepens and prolongs financial downturns for two reasons: returns on assets decrease more, and banks sharply decrease the liquidity supply in the interbank market. Calib...
متن کاملRisk, Leverage, and Regulation of Financial Intermediaries
This paper presents a model on the leverage of nancial intermediaries, where debt are held by risk averse agents and equity by the risk neutral. The paper shows that in an unregulated competitive market, nancial intermediaries choose to be leveraged over the social best level. This is because the leverage of one intermediary imposes a negative externality upon others by reducing their pro t m...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2544223