Empty Promises and Arbitrage
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Empty Promises and Arbitrage
Analysis of absence of arbitrage normally ignores payoffs in states to which the agent assigns zero probability. We extend the fundamental theorem of asset pricing to the case of “no empty promises” in which the agent cannot promise arbitrarily large payments in some states. There is a superpositive pricing rule that can assign positive price to claims in zero probability states important to th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Financial Studies
سال: 1999
ISSN: 0893-9454,1465-7368
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/12.4.807