Endogenous censoring in the mixed proportional hazard model with an application to optimal unemployment insurance
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Endogenous Search Effort
In the framework of a search and matching model, when search effort enters the labor market matching function, search effort by one worker generates a negative externality on other workers searching for jobs. The solution to the social planner’s problem may not be decentralized in a competitive market. Calibration shows that the current US unemployment insurance (UI) system generates an 8.07% w...
متن کاملan application of equilibrium model for crude oil tanker ships insurance futures in iran
با توجه به تحریم های بین المملی علیه صنعت بیمه ایران امکان استفاده از بازارهای بین المملی بیمه ای برای نفتکش های ایرانی وجود ندارد. از طرفی از آنجایی که یکی از نوآوری های اخیر استفاده از بازارهای مالی به منظور ریسک های فاجعه آمیز می باشد. از اینرو در این پایان نامه سعی شده است با استفاده از این نوآوری ها با طراحی اوراق اختیارات راهی نو جهت بیمه گردن نفت کش های ایرانی ارائه نمود. از آنجایی که بر...
Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Hidden Search Effort and Endogenous Savings∗
After first reviewing recent results on optimal unemployment insurance (UI) with unobserved search effort and hidden savings, this paper identifies that lump sum layoff payments play an important role. Simulations find that coordinating constant UI paid to the unemployed, with a severance payment that fully compensates for the drop in permanent income by being laid-off yields payoffs which are ...
متن کاملMoral hazard, optimal unemployment insurance, and experience rating
This paper is concerned with evaluating alternative unemployment insurance (UI) schemes in a dynamic economy with moral hazard. We consider changes in the size and duration of UI benefits, and the effects of experience rating, and use a dynamic contracting approach to determine a benchmark optimal allocation. Radical changes in the current UI system increase welfare, but not by much. A move to ...
متن کاملMoral Hazard vs. Liquidity in Unemployment Insurance
It is well known that higher unemployment bene ts lead to longer unemployment durations. This result has been interpreted as evidence of moral hazarda behavioral response to distorted marginal incentives to search. This paper shows that unemployment bene ts also raise durations through a liquiditye¤ect for households who cannot smooth consumption perfectly. The empirical importance of the ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Applied Econometrics
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0883-7252,1099-1255
DOI: 10.1002/jae.2731