Endogenous entry and self-selection in private value auctions: An experimental study
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Endogenous Entry and Self-selection in Private Value Auctions: An Experimental Study¤
This paper presents the results of an experimental study of endogenous entry and bidding behavior in ...rst-price independent private value auctions. In the ...rst stage N potential bidders simultaneously decide whether to participate in an auction or to claim a ...xed outside option. At this stage all potential bidders know N, the distribution of possible values, and the value of the outside o...
متن کاملEndogenous Entry in First-Price Private Value Auctions: the Self-Selection E¤ect
This paper studies the e¤ect of endogenous entry in ...rst-price private value auctions. Subjects decide, simultaneously, whether to participate in an auction, or to claim an outside option payo¤ for not participating. At this stage all subjects know the distribution of possible values, the number of potential entrants, and the amount of the ...xed outside option payment. After entry, each part...
متن کاملEndogenous Entry and Exit in Common Value Auctions
We develop and experimentally test a model of endogenous entry, exit, and bidding in common value auctions. The model and experimental design include an alternative profitable activity (a “safe haven”) that provides agentspecific opportunity costs of bidding in the auction. Each agent chooses whether to accept the safe haven income or forgo it in order to bid in the auction. Agents that enter t...
متن کاملOn the effects of joint bidding in independent private value auctions: An experimental study
This article explores the effect of a subset of symmetric bidders joining to bid together. Possible applications include mergers, collusion and joint-bidding arrangements. The change produces a "strong" party with a more advantageous value distribution than the remaining "weak" bidder(s). The predicted effects include ineffi ciency, a decrease in the seller’s revenue, and higher bidders’payoffs...
متن کاملAuctions with Private Entry Costs
Auctions with Private Entry Costs We study auctions where bidders have private information about their entry costs and the seller does not benefit from these entry costs. We consider a symmetric environment where all bidders have the same value for the object being sold, and also an asymmetric environment where bidders may have different valuations for the object. In these environments, the sel...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2006.06.005