Endogenous Firms' Organization, Internal Audit and Leniency Programs
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs∗
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Leniency programs as a tool for cartel detection and cartel destabilization, have been implemented since the early nineties. Theoretical work has shown that leniency programs can be effective in enhancing cartel detection and deterrence, but these effects are not straightforward. It is even possible that there is an increase in the total number of cartels. Empirical evidence shows that the posi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2660777