Endogenous Leadership in Teams

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Endogenous leadership in teams∗

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

سال: 2006

ISSN: 0932-4569

DOI: 10.1628/093245606777583495