Endogenous managerial compensation contracts in experimental quantity-setting duopolies
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Endogenous Timing in a Quantity Setting Duopoly
I provide an equilibrium analysis of the role of private information on timing decisions of duopolists in a quantity setting framework. The firms are privately informed about their costs and may decide their quantities in one of two dates. In the unique symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium, a firm with a low cost produces in the first date, while a firm with a high cost produces in the second...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Modelling
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0264-9993
DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2015.12.028