Endogenous Merger Waves in Vertically Related Industries
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Incentives for Sabotage in Vertically - Related Industries
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1958093