Endogenous Property Rights in a Hold-up Experiment

Endogenous Property Rights∗

It is often argued that additional checks and balances provide economic agents with better protection from expropriation of their wealth or productive capital. We demonstrate that in a dynamic political economy model this intuition may be flawed. Surprisingly, increasing the number veto players or the majority requirement for redistribution may reduce property right protection on the equilibriu...

Endogenous Recombinant Growth and Intellectual Property Rights

We show that, even in a framework in which monopolistic exploitation of patents does not occur, patents still give rise to serious drawbacks. We build on Weitzman’s (1998) recombinant growth model which provides a stylized but clear description of the formation of knowledge externalities. In our framework a benevolent government buys immediately new patents in a competitive market and releases ...

Animal Rights Consideration is a Necessity in Conducting an Experiment

property rights and economic growth: an endogenous growth mod

in this paper, we develop a ramsey-type endogenous growth model in which government spending on property rights protection is a major determinant of economic growth. this model includes equations for welfare, private and public sectors production. we introduce the legal efficiency into private production function, and x-inefficiency parameter into public production function. also, we consider t...

Property rights and efficiency in OLG models with endogenous fertility

Is there an economic rationale for pronatalist policies? We propose and analyze a particular market failure that leads to inefficiently low fertility in equilibrium. The friction is caused by the lack of ownership of children: if parents have no claim on their children’s income, the private benefit from producing a child can be smaller than the social benefit. We analyze an overlapping-generati...