Endogenous Wage Differentials, Imperfect Labor Mobility and Customs Unions Theory
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Modeling Endogenous Mobility in Wage Determination
We evaluate the bias from endogenous job mobility in fixed-effects estimates of workerand firm-specific earnings heterogeneity using longitudinally linked employer-employee data from the LEHD infrastructure file system of the U.S. Census Bureau. First, we propose two new residual diagnostic tests of the assumption that mobility is exogenous to unmodeled determinants of earnings. Both tests reje...
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All countries would agree to immediate global free trade if countries were compensated for any terms-of-trade losses with transfers from countries whose terms-of-trade improve, and if customs unions were required to have no effects on non-member countries. Global free trade with transfers is in the core of a Kemp-WanGrinols customs union game. (52 words)
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Overlapping bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) are proliferating in East Asia. Quite a few economists worry about the spaghetti bowl phenomenon expected from the proliferating East Asian regional trade agreements (RTAs).The complicated web of hub-and-spoke type of FTAs can result in high costs for verifying rules of origin (RoO). As an alternative policy option to avoid the negative effect ...
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In recent years, many econometric studies have confirmed the existence of inter-industry wage differentials. Even after controlling for a large number of joband worker related characteristics, and demographic variables, large and statistically significant industry wage differences remain. Moreover, these differences exist for union as well as for non-union workers and seem to be remarkably simi...
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Equilibrium search models obtained endogenous wage differentials among identical firms and workers based on the equal profit assumption. We formulate a more fundamentally dynamic game with identical players where workers can strategically quit and firms cannot commit to future wages, and find that equilibrium wage differentials arise due to different worker expectations on the firms’ future beh...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Integration
سال: 1989
ISSN: 1225-651X,1976-5525
DOI: 10.11130/jei.1989.4.1.15