Entry deterrence through credible commitment to transfer pricing at direct cost
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Entry deterrence through credible commitment to transfer pricing at direct cost
This paper examines the choice between direct and absorption costing in a cost-based transfer pricing system for duopolistic firms competing with product market prices. Existing literature has shown that the adoption of an absorption costing system,which drives up the intrafirm transfer price, strategically dominates direct costing for the two firms, regardless of whether the transfer price is ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Management Accounting Research
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1044-5005
DOI: 10.1016/j.mar.2013.01.001