Environmental Catastrophes under Time-Inconsistent Preferences
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Welfare Measurement under Threats of Environmental Catastrophes
Welfare measures under threats of environmental catastrophes are studied using the ”parable” apparatus of Weitzman and Löfgren [28]. The occurrence probability of the catastrophic events is driven (at least partly) by anthropogenic activities such as natural resource exploitation. Without external effects, the green NNP is a genuine welfare measure vis-à-vis a particular parable economy. Often,...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2281907