Environmental cooperation: contrasting international environmental agreements
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
International Environmental Agreements: Is Global Cooperation Possible?
The negotiation and ratification of the Kyoto Protocol has spawned a body of literature aimed at analyzing the formation of international environmental coalitions. This literature suggests that in equilibrium environmental agreements will have only a small number of signatories. As of April 2007, however, 168 countries have ratified the protocol; thirty-five of which have binding emissions redu...
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Theoretical analyses of international environmental agreements (IEAs) have typically employed the concept of self-enforcing agreements to predict the number of parties to such an agreement. The term self-enforcing, however, is a bit misleading. The concept refers to the stability of cooperative agreements, not to enforcing these agreements once they are in place. Most analyses of IEAs simply ig...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Oxford Economic Papers
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0030-7653,1464-3812
DOI: 10.1093/oep/gpw062