Envy and loss aversion in tournaments
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Envy and Compassion in Tournaments
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Psychology
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0167-4870
DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2012.06.006