منابع مشابه
Envy-Free Makespan Approximation
We study envy-free mechanisms for assigning tasks to agents, where every task may take a different amount of time to perform by each agent, and the goal is to get all the tasks done as soon as possible (i.e., minimize the makespan). For indivisible tasks, we put forward an envy-free polynomial mechanism that approximates the minimal makespan to within a factor ofO(logm), wherem is the number of...
متن کاملTight Lower Bounds on Envy-Free Makespan Approximation
In this work we give a tight lower bound on makespan approximations for envy-free allocation mechanism dedicated to scheduling tasks on unrelated machines. Specifically, we show that no mechanism exists that can guarantee an envy-free allocation of jobs to m machines with a makespan of less than a factor of O(logm) of the minimal makespan. Combined with previous results, this paper definitively...
متن کاملLower Bound for Envy-Free and Truthful Makespan Approximation on Related Machines
We study problems of scheduling jobs on related machines so as to minimize the makespan in the setting where machines are strategic agents. In this problem, each job j has a length lj and each machine i has a private speed ti. The running time of job j on machine i is tilj . We seek a mechanism that obtains speed bids of machines and then assign jobs and payments to machines so that the machine...
متن کاملMore than Envy-Free
There have been several interesting results in the literature on dividing up goods between self-interested parties such that the allocation is envy-free (Brams Taylor 1996). An allocation is deemed envy-free when every party (agent) believes that its share is not less than anyone else’s share. These procedures, however, are not efficient (in the sense of pareto optimality) general. Envy-free pr...
متن کاملEnvy-Free and Efficient Minimal Rights: Recursive No-Envy
In economics the main efficiency criterion is that of Pareto-optimality. For problems of distributing a social endowment a central notion of fairness is no-envy (each agent should receive a bundle at least as good, according to her own preferences, as any of the other agent’s bundle). For most economies there are multiple allocations satisfying these two properties. We provide a procedure, base...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SIAM Journal on Computing
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0097-5397,1095-7111
DOI: 10.1137/100801597