Epistemic Authority, Preemption and Normative Power
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Fundamentalism and Epistemic Authority
I will discuss three questions in my paper: 1. What are the essential elements of fundamentalism? 2. What is the role of authority as a source of fundamentalism? 3. What is the role of trust in the spreading of fundamentalism? For each question I will outline a possible answer from a special theoretical point of view. What is " fundamentalism " ? There is an ongoing discussion about this questi...
متن کاملNegotiating Epistemic Authority
Why do we trust what other people say, and form beliefs on the basis of their speech? One answer: they are taken to have epistemic authority. Intuitively this means that the other person (or institution, or group) is taken to be authoritative in what they say, at least with respect to a particular domain. Here, we want to claim that there are (at least) two varieties of epistemic authority, one...
متن کاملExceptional Cases: Epistemic Contributions and Normative Expectations
Exceptional cases are at odds with the typical: they stand out as bizarre and rare. What then could justify their systematic analysis? Elaborating the analytical distinction between anomalies, exceptions and outliers, this paper outlines three potential epistemic contributions of exceptional cases. First, exceptional cases reveal the limits of standard classification categories. In so doing, th...
متن کاملKnowledge, Moral Claims and the Exercise of Power in Global Health
A number of individuals and organizations have considerable influence over the selection of global health priorities and strategies. For some that influence derives from control over financial resources. For others it comes from expertise and claims to moral authority—what can be termed, respectively, epistemic and normative power. In contrast to financial power, we commonly take for granted th...
متن کاملArnon Keren * Epistemic Authority , Testimony and the Transmission of Knowledge
I present an account of what it is to trust a speaker, and argue that the account can explain the common intuitions which structure the debate about the transmission view of testimony. According to the suggested account, to trust a speaker is to grant her epistemic authority on the asserted proposition, and hence to see her opinion as issuing a second order, preemptive reason for believing the ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Journal for Philosophy of Religion
سال: 2014
ISSN: 1689-8311
DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v6i4.148