Epistemic Justification: Deontological Aspects
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Epistemic Justification: Foundationalism and Beyond
number of things I believed to be true. A few examples: I believed I was in Port aux Basques, Newfoundland. I believed I was caught up on my student loan payments. I believed that, when I was seven, a dog named Tuffy lived across the street with a family whose name I can’t recall. I believed all these things, but I was less confident in some of those beliefs than others. Why? One way of explain...
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The true belief components of Plato’s tripartite definition of knowledge as justified true belief are represented in formal epistemology by modal logic and its possible worlds semantics. At the same time, the justification component of Plato’s definition did not have a formal representation. This paper introduces the notion of justification into formal epistemology. Epistemic logic with justifi...
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Among many reasons for which contemporary philosophers take coherentism in epistemology seriously, the most important is probably the perceived inadequacy of alternative accounts, most notably misgivings about foundationalism. But coherentism also receives straightforward support from cases in which beliefs are apparently justified by their coherence. From the perspective of those against coher...
متن کاملBasic systems of epistemic logic with justification
An issue of an epistemic logic with justification has been discussed since the early 1990s. Such a logic, along with the usual knowledge operator 2F (F is known), should contain assertions t:F (t is a justification for F ), which gives a more nuanced and realistic model of knowledge. In this paper, we build two systems of epistemic logic with justification: the minimal one—S4LP—which is an exte...
متن کاملBottom Up justification , asymmetric epistemic push , and the fragility of higher order justification
When a first order belief accurately reflects the evidence, how should this affect the epistemic justification of a higher order belief that this is the case? In an influential paper, Kelly argues that first order evidential accuracy tends to generate more justified higher order beliefs (Kelly 2010). Call this Bottom Up. I argue that neither general views about what justifies our higher order b...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Siberian Journal of Philosophy
سال: 2020
ISSN: 2541-7517
DOI: 10.25205/2541-7517-2020-18-2-75-84