Epistemic Norms, the False Belief Requirement, and Love
نویسندگان
چکیده
Many authors have argued that epistemic rationality sometimes comes into conflict with our relationships. Although Sarah Stroud and Simon Keller argue friendships require bad agency, their proposals do not go far enough. I here for a more radical claim—romantic love requires we form beliefs are false. Lovers stand in special position one another; they owe things to another others. Such demands hold as well. Two facets of ground what call the false belief requirement , or demand when it is good beloved: right reasons refrain from doxastic wronging. Since truth indispensable rationality, believe falsely, consequently, undermines norms. demonstrate that, obtains, there an irreconcilable between norms rationality: must forsake one, at least time, other.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Logos & Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['2069-0533', '2069-3052']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202112322