Epistemic Sanity or Why You Shouldn't be Opinionated or Skeptical

Abstract I propose the notion of ‘epistemic sanity’, a property parsimony between holding true but not false beliefs and consideration our cognitive limitations. Where ‘alethic value’ is epistemic value beliefs, potential’ an agent amount extra alethic that she expected to achieve, given her current environment, reasoning skills. Epistemic sanity would be related (true or false) increase agent's potential (relevant beliefs) decrease it (this parsimony). Suspension judgment, forgetting, clutter avoidance are main contributors sanity, where this paper focuses on suspension. argue rational suspension favors relevant which case for extremes opinionation (no suspension) skepticism (general suspension). In absence evidence, opinionated agents often forced rely principles such as principle indifference, dominates indifference in terms some conditions. A only find beneficial adopt if considers herself anti-expert about entire agenda, then ‘flipping’ maximizes relation skepticism. The study results ‘impure’ veritism, can deal with limitations veritism (e.g., explaining existence beliefs).