Equal representation in two-tier voting systems
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Equal representation in two-tier voting systems
The paper investigates how voting weights should be assigned to differently sized constituencies of an assembly. The one-person, one-vote principle is interpreted as calling for a priori equal indirect influence on decisions. The latter are elements of a one-dimen sional convex policy space and may result from strategic behavior consistent with the median voter theorem. Numerous artificial cons...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-006-0186-z