Equilibria in ordinal status games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Equilibria in Ordinal Games: A Framework based on Possibility Theory
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Economics
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0304-4068
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.07.010