Equilibrium and efficiency under pure entitlement systems

Does Entitlement Crowd Out Efficiency or Equality Seeking ?

In generosity games, one agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas the other is endogenously determined by the proposer’s choice of the ”pie” size. This has been shown to induce pie choices which are either efficiency or equality seeking. In our experiment, before playing the generosity game, participants are asked to buy their role via a random price mechanism. This should entitle them to...

Equilibrium Pure States and Nonequilibrium Chaos

We consider nonequilibrium systems such as the Edwards-Anderson Ising spin glass at a temperature where, in equilibrium, there are presumed to be (two or many) broken symmetry pure states. Following a deep quench, we argue that as time t → ∞, although the system is usually in some pure state locally, either it never settles permanently on a fixed lengthscale into a single pure state, or it does...

Semi-fermionic Representation for Spin Systems under Equilibrium and Non-equilibrium Conditions

We present a general derivation of semi-fermionic representation for spin operators in terms of a bilinear combination of fermions in real and imaginary time formalisms. The constraint on fermionic occupation numbers is fulfilled by means of imaginary Lagrange multipliers resulting in special shape of quasiparticle distribution functions. We show how Schwinger-Keldysh technique for spin operato...

Marketing entitlement contracts and . . .

Pure Exchange Equilibrium of Dynamic Economic Models

This paper studies competitive equilibrium over time of a one good model in which the agents are members of a population which grows at a constant rate. Each agent lives for n periods and in the i-th period of his life receives an endowment of ei units of goods. Goods can neither be produced nor stored. The model is thus the n-period generalization of the twoand three-period models studied by S...