Equilibrium computation in discrete network games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Equilibrium Computation for Extensive Games
This thesis studies equilibrium computation algorithms for extensive games. We focus on the enumeration of Nash equilibria and on the computation of an extensive form correlated equilibrium. The contribution of this thesis consists of two parts. First, we study an algorithm for enumerating all Nash equilibria of a two-player extensive game. This algorithm is based on the sequence form descripti...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Quantitative Economics
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1759-7323
DOI: 10.3982/qe1386