Equilibrium in Scoring Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Ascending Combinatorial Scoring Auctions
In multi-attribute procurement auctions with multiple objects, the auctioneer may care about the interplay of quality attributes that do not belong to the same item – like each item’s delivery time, if all items are needed at once. This can influence the performance of the auction mechanism. We generalize the Ausubel-Milgrom ascending proxy auction to such an environment and show that the main ...
متن کاملProperties of scoring auctions
This article studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products. suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level ofnonmonetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behavior in scoring auctions when suppliers 'private information is multidimensional (characterization of equil...
متن کاملBundling Equilibrium in Combinatorial auctions
This paper analyzes ex post equilibria in the VCG combinatorial auctions. If Σ is a family of bundles of goods, the organizer may restrict the bundles on which the participants submit bids, and the bundles allocated to them, to be in Σ . The Σ-VCG combinatorial auctions obtained in this way are known to be truth-telling mechanisms. In contrast, this paper deals with non-restricted VCG auctions,...
متن کاملEquilibrium Prices in Bundle Auctions
The allocation of discrete, complementary resources is a fundamental problem in economics and of direct interest to e-commerce applications. In this paper we establish that competitive equilibrium bundle prices always exist that support the efficient allocation in discrete resource allocation problems with free disposal. We believe that this is an important step in the quest for a mechanism tha...
متن کاملEquilibrium Analysis of Electricity Auctions
This paper considers an electricity spot market consisting of a network, a set of producers located in nodes of the network, and a central agent. Production is organized by means of an auction. Once firms simultaneously bid cost functions, the central agent decides the quantity each firm produces and the flows through the network lines. The purpose of the central agent is to minimize the overal...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2004
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.624466