Equilibrium of repeated games with cost of implementation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
ɛ-Consistent equilibrium in repeated games
We introduce the concept of e-consistent equilibrium where each player plays a e-best response after every history reached with positive probability. In particular, an e-consistent equilibrium induces an e-equilibrium in any subgame reached along the play path. The existence of e-consistent equilibrium is examined in various repeated games. The main result is the existence in stochastic games w...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 1992
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(92)90104-p