Equilibrium Principal-Agent Contracts: Competition and R&D Incentives
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Incentives, Contracts and Markets: A General Equilibrium Theory of Firms∗
This paper takes steps toward integrating firm theory in the spirit of Alchian & Demsetz (1972) and Grossman & Hart (1986), contract theory in the spirit of Holmstrom (1979), and general equilibrium theory in the spirit of Arrow & Debreu (1954) and McKenzie (1959). In the model presented here, the set of firms that form and the contractual arrangements that appear, the assignments of agents to ...
متن کاملContracts, Fairness, and Incentives
We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on both the actual and the optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Explicit incentive contracts that are optimal according to self-interest theory become inferior when some agents value fairness. Conversely, implicit bonus contracts that are doomed to fail among purely selfish actors provide powerful incenti...
متن کاملTopics of Principal-Agent Contracts: Contract Analysis and Pooling Principals
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
متن کاملMultitask principal-agent problems: Optimal contracts, fragility, and effort misallocation
We analyze a tractable class of multitask principal–agent problems, such as the one faced by a firm with a manager overseeing several projects. We allow for tasks to be complements or substitutes. We avoid the problems associated with the first-order approach by directly characterizing the shape of the agent’s indirect utility function, which exhibits a convex then concave shape in effort. We i...
متن کاملFairness and Incentives in a Multi-task Principal–Agent Model*
This paper reports on a two-task principal–agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece-rate contracts. Many principals reward high effort on both tasks with substantial bonuses. Agents anticipate this and provide high effort on both tasks. In contrast,...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1058-6407
DOI: 10.1111/jems.12021