Equilibrium selection in interdependent value auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Information Acquisition in Interdependent Value Auctions By
We consider an auction environment with interdependent values. Each bidder can learn her payoff type through costly information acquisition. We contrast the socially optimal decision to acquire information with the equilibrium solution in which each agent has to privately bear the cost of information acquisition. In the context of the generalized Vickrey–Clarke– Groves mechanism, we establish t...
متن کاملInformation Acquisition in Interdependent Value Auctions
We consider an auction environment with interdependent values. Each bidder can learn her payoff type through costly information acquisition. We contrast the socially optimal decision to acquire information with the equilibrium solution in which each agent has to privately bear the cost of information acquisition. In the context of the generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, we establish th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Social Sciences
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0165-4896
DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.01.003