منابع مشابه
Equilibrium Selection in Stochastic Games
In this paper a selection theory for stochastic games is developed. The theory itself is based on the ideas of Harsanyi and Selten to select equilibria for games in standard form. We introduce several possible definitions for the stochastic tracing procedure, an extension of the linear tracing procedure to the class of stochastic games. We analyze the properties of these alternative definitions...
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Using the fact that any two player discounted stochastic game with finite state and action spaces can be recast as a non-convex constrained optimization problem, where each global minima corresponds to a stationary Nash equilibrium, we present a sequential quadratic programming based algorithm that converges to a KKT point. This KKT point is an -Nash equilibrium for some > 0 and under some suit...
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In this paper, graphical games, a compact graphical representation for multi-player game theory is introduced. Various Nash equilibrium computing algorithms for graphical games are reviewed and a naive join tree base approximate Nash equilibrium computing algorithm is proposed. The proposed algorithm can be efficiently used in graphical games with arbitrary underlying structure. Graphical repre...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Game Theory Review
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0219-1989,1793-6675
DOI: 10.1142/s0219198903001082